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 The Development of Intermediation in
 French Credit Markets. Evidence from the
 Estates of Burgundy
 MARK POTTER AND JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL
 We document how intermediaries shaped markets or, conversely, how market institu-
 tions constrained intermediaries. In Dijon, where the Estates of Burgundy's debt
 amounted to nearly half of all bonds in that small market, there was limited need for
 intermediaries. In the 1740s the borrowing needs of the province expanded, and the
 estates began to borrow in Paris, where their debt remained a small fraction of the
 market, and where they relied on notaries to place their bonds and to create a second-
 ary market. These developments assured the estates' capacity to borrow and thus
 Burgundian autonomy from the French Crown.
 istorians have traditionally viewed French financial development under
 the Old Regime against the benchmark of the more advanced English
 case. They have looked for organizations and institutions that had been
 critical to the growth of English markets, such as stock markets and banks,
 in order to explain French economic developments.1 This focus was bound
 to mislead because other intermediaries, especially notaries, served to inte-
 grate eighteenth-century French credit markets.2 In this article, we examine
 the growth of the market for the bonds of the Estates of Burgundy between
 1700 and 1789. The unique political and financial role of the Estates of
 Burgundy allows us to chart how intermediaries shaped markets or, con-
 versely, how market institutions constrained intermediaries. We can do so
 because the estates borrowed simultaneously in two cities, Paris and Dijon,
 which had distinctly different market institutions.
 The Estates of Burgundy were the provincial assemblies of the eastern
 French province of Burgundy. Though there were three chambers they acted
 as one in their financial dealings. Their responsibilities included negotiating
 the province's tax burden with the crown as well as collecting levies and
 overseeing local expenditures. Their fiscal responsibilities led them to enter
 into credit markets. From 1660 to 1789 the estates' borrowing increased
 markedly (from 280,000 livres per year at the outset to 1.8 million livres per
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 year in the 1780s). At first they borrowed in Dijon, the provincial capital,
 and relied mostly on local investors. But even early on, the estates could not
 satisfy their peak borrowing needs from local savers, and they relied on
 informal networks to attract Parisian funds to the Dijon market. As borrow-
 ing became more regular and more important, the role of Parisian lenders
 increased, and in the early 1740s the estates began to place a large part of
 their debt issues directly in Paris. As a result, Parisian investors were solic-
 ited regularly through Parisian intermediaries. It is the different behavior of
 the estates in the two markets that allows us to identify important dimen-
 sions of the growth of credit.
 Because officers of the estates kept very detailed records of their borrow-
 ing, we can quantify how the market for the estates' debt evolved.3 We
 assembled a database on more than 23,000 loan transactions. These include
 all the initial loans received by the estates and all secondary transactions that
 were recorded in their registers from 1660 to 1790. As best we can tell after
 cross-referencing the data with information from the estates' deliberations,
 the database includes nearly all loans after 1680.4 For each bond we tran-
 scribed its value and dates of contract and of repayment, along with the
 names of the lender and his or her social indicators, including titles, profes-
 sion, gender, and residence. We also gathered information on the intermedi-
 aries who helped place bonds on the market after 1690 when their identities
 became regularly recorded, and we compiled data on loan resales. The data
 on secondary transactions are most complete for those contracts resold in
 Paris because the legal nature of bonds in the capital required the estates'
 scribes to record resales. Our data are thus both extensive and comprehen-
 sive; they effectively capture the market for the Burgundian Estates' debt as
 it unfolded in two distinct locales over more than a century.
 Two objectives drive this study. By clarifying how intermediation for
 Burgundian bonds developed, we can better situate the Estates of Burgundy
 in our understanding of both political and financial institutions in Old-
 Regime France.5 We also seek a more general understanding of how credit
 markets can be created. There may arise a demand for intermediation to
 which individuals and institutions respond endogenously. Alternatively, the
 state might intervene and promote formal arrangements, such as a central
 bank or stock exchange. In exploring either scenario, we want to argue
 against the common assumption that Old-Regime institutions stunted the
 development of French credit markets and prevented their growth.
 3Archives Departementales de la Cote d'Or, [hereafter ADCO] registers C 4573,4576,4577,4578,
 4579, 4580, 4581, 4582, 4583, 4584, 4585, 4586, 4587, 4588, 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618,
 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4631, 4632, 4634, 4635, 4638, 4639, 4640, 4641, 4649, 4654, 4659, 4664,
 4668, 4671, 4680, 4685, 4704, 4720, 4721, 4726, 4727, and 4728.
 4 The registers from prior to 1680 are incomplete.
 5 We take a more explicit political approach to the role of the Estates of Burgundy in Potter and
 Rosenthal, "Politics."
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 We document that over the course of the eighteenth century the pool of
 investors in estates' bonds broadened. This evolution requires us to ask how
 new investors acquired information about the estates. We focus on the inter-
 mediaries that placed the estates' bonds and organized the secondary trans-
 actions. We then show that the organization of intermediation depended on
 the importance of the estates in the aggregate markets. We then examine the
 evidence on the secondary market to argue that by some measure at least,
 turnover of the estates' bonds was not qualitatively different from the vol-
 ume of transactions carried out on early stock markets. We conclude that
 declines in transaction costs were obtained by a mix of deliberate formal
 actions by the French crown (which benefited the whole financial sector)
 and by the estates (which improved the appeal of their bonds) and of infor-
 mal actions taken by intermediaries. We begin however with a brief review
 of theories of intermediation and some historical background on the rise of
 the Estates of Burgundy as a major borrower.
 The experience of the Estates of Burgundy provides valuable information
 about the conditions under which intermediation (and in particular broker-
 age) will arise. Financial exchanges that are not mediated face high transac-
 tion costs for many reasons (such as asymmetric information, risk aversion,
 and physical distance). There is broad agreement that the demand for inter-
 mediation will increase as the transaction costs of unmediated exchange
 increase. Intermediaries can arise to reduce these costs. In this article we
 focus on two factors that affect transaction costs and thus motivate the de-
 velopment of brokerage: search costs, and competition between markets.
 Scholars of financial markets have long studied changes in intermedia-
 tion. But the scholarship has very often focused on the intermediaries rather
 than on the final parties to contracts. Thus we have excellent histories of
 banks, stock markets, and stock brokers, as well as a host of other less com-
 mon intermediaries. Economic theorists have examined the rise of financial
 intermediation in a variety of contexts and in particular in the case of broker-
 age. Others have sought to understand the value of different forms of organi-
 zation. All these studies emphasize the role of asymmetric information in
 creating demand for intermediation. This demand arises both in the case of
 the initial placement of bonds and in the case of secondary transactions. In
 either case if borrowers, or current holders of bonds, do not know much
 about who has money to invest, they will have difficulty securing loans or
 reselling their bonds. Similarly, lenders are unlikely to place funds in bonds
 about which they have little information.
 It is worthwhile to consider the question separately for initial placement
 and for secondary trades, for these two intermediation functions need not be
 performed by the same organizations. In the case of the initial placement of
 bonds, borrowers may want to rely upon an intermediary who provides
 investment banking services. We take as one of our hypotheses that borrow-
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 ers will be more dependent on such intermediaries in markets where they are
 less well known (or have higher cost of communicating with investors).
 In the case of secondary trades, the investor who wants to sell a bond
 either may have to wait a long time before a willing buyer is found or to
 accept a steep discount for an immediate sale-in this case the bond is
 illiquid. Not surprisingly investors will demand a premium to hold such
 bonds-a premium the borrower would rather avoid paying. We consider
 one key source of illiquidity: asymmetric information. There will be few
 trades in a security if buyers and sellers cannot find one another, and if
 potential buyers cannot get some information about the value of the security.
 There are many ways in which such information can be provided, but which
 one is picked depends on how much of a security is outstanding. In other
 words there are thresholds that dictate how liquidity is provided, and these
 thresholds operate both at the level of a given security and at the level of the
 market at as a whole.
 To begin with, if the market is small enough and all the potential buyers
 of the security know both one another and the issuer, then intermediaries
 cannot improve information.6 Most often, however, the market is not that
 small and one could increase liquidity by centralizing all the information
 about supply and demand. The standard solution to the problem of liquidity
 is a centralized market where all the information about desired trades is
 aggregated.7 Yet such markets are costly to set up and maintain. Thus they
 typically require a minimum volume to survive, creating a second threshold.8
 Hence, institutions that mimic centralized markets will be demanded when-
 ever the volume of trades does not warrant an exchange, but where the num-
 ber of potential investors is large enough that decentralized communication
 is not feasible. These institutions need not be formal. For instance, an infor-
 mal specialist may emerge to hold a book of orders for a particular security.
 Although the history of formal (centralized) secondary markets is well
 analyzed in the literature, the conditions under which alternative institutions
 arise are less well documented. Our hypothesis is that the demand for resale
 intermediation increases with market size-where size is defined by the total
 value of securities outstanding. In small markets the number of participants
 is small enough that it is not worthwhile to organize a secondary market.
 Even if there is some demand for intermediation there may only be enough
 business for one intermediary.9 In larger markets, however, the volume of
 trade may sustain more intermediaries.
 6 In this case there may still remain a liquidity problem, but these will be solved not by trading in a
 security but by borrowing against it.
 7 See Neal, Rise.
 8 For an example of an exchange that failed early-on due to insufficient volume, see Hanley, "Busi-
 ness Finance."
 9 We were inspired to think about the interaction between sunk costs and market structure by John
 Sutton's emphasis on the role of advertisement (durable investment in consumer knowledge) in shaping
 market structure (see Sunk Costs).
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 Focusing now on a given security rather than on the market as a whole,
 leads us to a second conjecture. An informal specialist is more likely to arise
 when an individual bond issue amounts to a small fraction of the total value
 of debt. In this case, some sort of institution for increasing liquidity is worth-
 while even though it does not pay to bear the cost of creating a formal sec-
 ondary market in that issue. Further, because the market for that security is
 thin, it is inefficient for each intermediary to keep a book of his own.'0
 On a third level, we want to use the experience of the Estates of Burgundy
 to examine how competition between markets can assist in the development
 of intermediation. Here we are inspired by the similarities between the expe-
 rience of the estates with that of foreign firms that have recently listed their
 shares on American or British exchanges." To do so they have engaged the
 services of investment banks in order to create depository receipt programs.
 The creation of these programs has brought more liquidity to the firms, but
 it has also often induced them to change accounting procedures and it has put
 pressure on intermediaries in the home markets to reduce transaction costs.
 Because the estates could place their bonds either in Paris or Dijon, and
 because the holders of Burgundian bonds could resell them either in Paris
 or Dijon, the intermediaries in the two markets competed. However, the
 estates were in very different positions in the two markets. In Dijon they
 were by far the dominant player whereas in Paris they held little sway over
 the market. We show that to reach Parisian investors, the estates adapted
 their financial structure to the requirements of the capital's intermediaries.
 In turn, intermediaries in Dijon responded to the increasing competition
 from Paris by improving their secondary market. From the perspective of
 intermediaries the borrowing of the estates had very different consequences
 in the two cities. The estates' widespread and excellent credit reputation in
 Dijon probably slowed the rise of intermediation there because the estates
 did not need much assistance to place their bonds. In Paris the estates had
 no such reputation. But they arrived in an already large market well served
 by intermediaries on whom they depended both for primary placement and
 to create a secondary market. Thus their arrival in Paris added fuel to the
 growth of the capital's already thriving financial-intermediary networks.
 THE BURGUNDIAN ESTATES AND THE CROWN'S DEBTS
 The Burgundian Estates were one of many privileged corporations that
 were central to the organization of the French state. Such corporations, or
 corps, were either territorial (municipalities and provincial estates), or pro-
 fessional (artisan guilds and venal officer corps).'2 The Assembly of the
 10 This argument parallels the distinction between formal and curb markets in the stock-exchange
 context.
 t Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, "International Cross Listing."
 12 Farr, Hands of Honor; and Olivier-Martin, Organisation corporative.
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 Clergy, to take one of the most prominent examples, comprised the first
 order of the kingdom in those provinces that had been part of the kingdom
 the longest (prior to 1561), and it taxed its members to supply funds to the
 crown.13 Corps differed from one another in many ways, but shared a com-
 mon feature in claiming a unique privileged status that defined their relation-
 ship both to the crown and to one another in political and financial matters.
 The Burgundian Estates' privileges were codified in 1477 when the duchy
 of Burgundy was annexed to France. Every three years, the estates gathered
 representatives of all three orders of the province at which time their main
 function was to negotiate tax levels with the crown. On a superficial level,
 therefore, the estates acted as a sort of parliament for Burgundy-through
 them, provincial leaders determined tax levels and administered revenue
 collections, passing agreed-upon sums to the crown. The privilege of hold-
 ing estates conferred a degree of financial autonomy on the provincial lead-
 ers and enhanced the potential for collaboration between the crown and local
 elite groups. Yet the preservation of this autonomy was tenuous and de-
 pended in part on royal good will.
 Privilege was a unique form of property in Old Regime France in that its
 creation and preservation depended upon the good will of the king.'4 The
 privileges by which the Burgundian leaders held triennial sessions of estates
 and managed local financial affairs with some independence were no differ-
 ent. Legally the king could abrogate them should he find such an attack more
 expedient. Although it is true that the desire to preserve order constrained the
 crown from undermining such privileges and promoted a strategy of protect-
 ing the mutual interests of crown and elite, such political constraints did not
 change the reality that the crown enjoyed significant leverage should provin-
 cial estates attempt to assert greater autonomy. Indeed, in the first half of the
 seventeenth century the crown worked against the financial autonomy of
 provinces with estates.s1 Though they were targeted, the Estates of Burgundy
 avoided the dissolution with which they were threatened and which the Es-
 tates of Normandy and, more recently, Dauphine suffered. Thereafter, how-
 ever, it was clear that those provincial estates that survived, most prominently
 those in Burgundy, Languedoc, Provence, and Brittany, did so only insofar
 as they were useful to the crown's financial needs. Indeed, failing to provide
 sufficient resources could lead to royal circumvention of local financial
 autonomy either on an ad hoc or a permanent basis.'6
 In the end, provincial estates and the local financial autonomy that they
 assured served the interests of both the crown and local elite groups. As the
 financial needs of the crown grew under Louis XIV, the Estates of Burgundy
 confronted the seemingly conflicting necessity of meeting the crown's de-
 3 Michaud, L 'Eglise et 'argent.
 4 Bien, "Offices and State Credit," p. 92; and Bossenga, Politics, pp. 1-21.
 5 Bonney, Political Change, pp. 344-83; and Major, From Renaissance Monarchy, pp. 236-60.
 16 Major, From Renaissance Monarchy, pp. 236-60; and Beik, Absolutism, p. 132.
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 mands while still preserving the advantages of the province's privileged
 status. They turned to the credit market to balance such opposing demands.
 The estates were able to keep regular taxation low by periodically agreeing
 to borrow large sums for the crown. Such borrowing increased from 3.56
 million livres over the decade 1680-1689 to 6.66 million in the following
 decade (during the Nine Years' War) and then to 12.01 and 15.14 million
 livres over the first two decades of the eighteenth century, respectively.17
 Meanwhile, the annual "tax" obligations, which the estates had negotiated
 to pay the crown (the don gratuit, the exemption, and the subsistence) and
 which were financed mostly through levies of the land tax (the taille), in-
 creased at a much slower pace. These remained stable during the 1680s and
 1690s at an average of slightly under one million livres per year. The addi-
 tion of the capitation in 1702 doubled the total annual obligations through
 1709, but then that added payment was reduced by 40 percent in 1710. Over
 the following decade, total annual "tax" payments averaged between 1.5 and
 1.6 million livres. Thus, in this time of"squeeze," when the crown urgently
 sought to mobilize resources to meet the increased costs of warfare, borrow-
 ing by the Estates of Burgundy increased at more than twice the rate of the
 regular "tax" obligations.18
 To fund these loans the crown allowed the estates to mortgage (and hence
 keep within their control) the revenues from specified taxes. Early on, this
 usually entailed allowing the estates to control and earmark entire revenue
 streams, such as the octrois de la Saone, or a series of tolls on goods shipped
 along the Saone River. Later in the eighteenth century, the crown typically
 allowed reductions in the estates' regular payments to the crown, with those
 remissions earmarked for debt servicing. For example when in 1770 the
 estates borrowed three million livres for the crown, they were allowed to
 reduce their fiscal transfers to Paris by 300,000 a year until the loan was
 paid off.19 The crown was able to benefit from this arrangement by essen-
 tially borrowing at lower costs because of the estates' sterling credit reputa-
 tion; provincial leaders, on the other hand, in particular those with strong
 ties to the land, benefited by keeping land taxes nominally stable in periods
 of heightened royal needs.20 Indeed, local financial autonomy was preserved,
 and in some ways enhanced, by the expanded financial role of the estates as
 a major borrower for the crown.21
 The Burgundian Estates thus found themselves under political pressure
 to assume debt for the crown. This pressure began during the reign of Louis
 '7 Potter and Rosenthal, "Politics," p. 579.
 18 ADCO, C 2982-2983. The capitation was also in place briefly from 1695 to 1698, during which
 time royal authorities levied it in Burgundy directly as a scaled poll tax. Estimates of how much the
 crown raised in those years are not available. See Saint-Jacob, Paysans, p. 180.
 '9 ADCO, C 4568 Deliberation des Elus 21 Mars 1770
 20 For similar developments in Brittany that favored the landed elite there, see Collins, Classes.
 21 Potter, "Institutions," Chs. 3-4.
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 XIV and lasted to the end of the Old Regime. That the estates prospered as
 a financial conduit for the crown and as a local political force is unmistak-
 able: their indebtedness steadily rose and, in the 1780s, they used their fiscal
 clout to promote large-scale transport improvement. Yet in the late seven-
 teenth century as the estates' indebtedness rose, they found it increasingly
 necessary to borrow from beyond the Dijonnais market of local elite inves-
 tors. Had the estates not found new sources of funds it is likely that their
 political life would have been shortened.
 LENDERS TO THE BURGUNDIAN ESTATES
 As suggested previously, the estates broadened the geographical and
 social diversity of the savers who invested in their bonds. In the seventeenth
 century, the estates turned primarily toward local Burgundian notables. In
 the decades following Louis XIV's reign, however, the role of local Dijon-
 nais notables diminished while a broader base of Parisian lenders became
 more important. Dijonnais lenders dominated among investors through the
 first decade of the eighteenth century. To be sure Burgundian lenders from
 outside Dijon also took on a significant share of debt over these decades
 (Table 1). Nonetheless between 1660 and 1709, over three-quarters of the
 funds lent came from families, individuals, and institutions within Bur-
 gundy.22 A shift then occurred in the 1720s and 1730s so that by the decade
 of the 1740s, 54 percent of the funds lent to the estates came from Paris.
 Thereafter, a majority of the loans were raised in Paris through the decade
 of the 1780s, and by 1790, approximately 60 percent of all outstanding debt
 was Parisian-held. At the same time, a shift also occurred in the social iden-
 tities of those providing funds to the estates (Table 2). The share of funds
 lent by judicial and financial officers diminished just as the estates began
 borrowing more of their funds from Parisians. Between 1727 and 1789, the
 share of funds lent by these two groups amounted to only 19 percent where-
 as prior to 1713 they had contributed 49 percent of all funds lent to the
 estates. As their share diminished, that of royal officers, military officers,
 and nobles grew from a combined total of 17 percent of funds lent (1660-
 1713) to 36 percent of funds lent (1727 to 1789).23 Equally striking is the
 increase in funds lent by individuals in trades, crafts or professions. Their
 22 Our data allow us to assign residences to more than 96 percent of all bondholders accounting for
 94 percent of all sums loaned. Burgundian, and in particular Dijonnais, dominance of this market in
 the earlier decades is clear: In the decade of the 1660s, 91 percent of all funds lent came from Dijon
 with 4 percent from Burgundy (outside of Dijon). For the decade of the 1670s, the respective figures
 are 93 percent and 2 percent; 1680, 66 percent and 10 percent; 1690, 71 percent and 10 percent and
 1700, 59 percent and 18 percent. For a more extensive discussion on the geographical distribution of
 the estates' debt, see Potter and Rosenthal, "Burgundian Estates' Bond Market."
 23 Royal officers included officers of the royal household and ministries and the difficult-to-classify
 secrgtaires du roi who often had no practical responsibilities.
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 TABLE 1
 GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGINS OF LENDERS TO THE ESTATES
 Dijon Burgundy Paris France Foreign
 Average Number of
 Contracts per Year Percentage of Contracts
 1660-1699 70 81.4 10.9 4.9 0.6 0.1
 1700-1719 228 58.5 19.2 14.1 5.0 0.3
 1720-1739 75 55.5 16.0 21.0 2.1 1.2
 1740-1759 212 34.5 11.7 40.9 4.2 1.7
 1760-1779 333 23.4 9.4 50.9 5.9 0.8
 1780-1790 425 18.7 11.7 53.9 8.9 1.4
 Funds Lent per Year Percentage of Funds Lent
 1660-1699 285,775 80.2 10.6 4.0 0.2 1.1
 1700-1719 1,050,068 58.2 16.0 16.9 6.2 0.7
 1720-1739 329,677 54.3 13.4 24.3 2.1 1.4
 1740-1759 903,346 33.1 12.9 40.2 4.1 1.6
 1760-1779 1,526,999 24.5 7.5 53.1 6.3 0.6
 1780-1790 1,817,053 18.5 9.9 59.1 8.0 0.6
 Note: The entries in the last five columns of the table are row percentages.
 Sources: The data were drawn from AD CO, registers, C 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625,
 4626, 4627, 4628, 4631, 4632, 4634, 4635, 4638, 4639,4640, 4641, 4649, 4654, 4659.
 share rose from 16 percent in the first period to 27 percent in the second.24
 As these shifts were taking place, the total amounts of money that the
 Burgundian Estates sought from investors also grew over the course of the
 century.
 Many Old Regime public institutions espoused principles of prudential
 debt management: borrowing in times of stress and running surpluses during
 times of plenty.25 The estates were exceptional only in the assiduity with
 which they implemented these principles. Although they borrowed via per-
 petual annuities (rentes perpetuelles) for which they were under no legal
 obligation to reimburse the principal, they nevertheless chose to adhere to
 an announced schedule of reimbursement. Reimbursements and interest
 payments were funded by mortgaging specific future revenues. When these
 revenues accrued the loans were reimbursed. Hence their loans, unlike those
 of the crown, were true sinking funds. New loans, therefore, need not repre-
 sent increases in total debt load. The figures for loan issues suggest that wars
 were periods of increased indebtedness and that the overall trend was toward
 a greater debt load in the last decades of the Old Regime. It is not possible
 to know what bonds were outstanding in each year because reimbursement
 dates were not recorded for all contracts. Yet estimates of the estates' debts
 24 Potter and Rosenthal, "Politics."
 25 Le Goff"How to Finance."
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 TABLE 2
 SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THE ESTATES BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
 Numbers of Trades and Liberal Military Clergy and
 Contracts Officers Crafts Professions Domestics and Nobles Institutions
 1660-1699 2,104 67.3 3.0 10.2 2.0 10.5 1.2
 1700-1719 4,476 55.7 7.3 10.4 4.2 12.9 2.7
 1720-1739 1,482 55.9 5.5 7.4 6.5 12.6 3.1
 1740-1759 4,066 39.0 19.5 9.3 5.6 8.6 5.6
 1760-1779 6,454 27.7 20.5 9.1 7.5 11.7 7.2
 1780-1790 4,185 23.2 23.9 9.4 6.3 14.2 5.9
 Note: The entries in the last six columns of the table are row percentages, the omitted categories are
 women, unclassified royal officers, agriculture, and unknown.
 Sources: The data were drawn from AD CO, registers, C 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625,
 4626, 4627, 4628, 4631, 4632, 4634, 4635, 4638, 4639, 4640, 4641, 4649, 4654, and 4659.
 show that they grew during wars and then fell in peace time.26 The decline
 could be dramatic: between 1765 and 1778 the estates reduced their liabili-
 ties by nearly half.
 During the early part of the eighteenth century when the estates consis-
 tently borrowed more than one million livres per year, the province's offi-
 cials began to search well beyond the rather limited group of local notables
 for potential investors. As a result, the institutional mechanisms of piecing
 together a clientele of lenders became ever more important for the estates to
 meet their obligations to the crown. Beyond offering the financial incentives
 and the political assurances necessary to attract investors, the estates con-
 fronted the mundane logistical issues of relaying information about their
 debt issues and bridging both geographical and social gaps in the placement
 of bonds, the payment of interest, and the reimbursement of principal.
 The market for Burgundian debt thus underwent significant changes along
 with an overall broadening during the period captured in our data. Through-
 out the history of this market, person-to-person contacts through the services
 of intermediaries remained the key to piecing together a clientele of lenders
 even as that clientele broadened and as the estates managed to enhance their
 reputation as a responsible borrower.27 Meanwhile, the overall institutional
 framework in which this market evolved remained unchanged. The market
 existed by virtue of the political balance between the estates and the crown.
 The crown respected the estates' independence because it found their reputa-
 tion for creditworthiness valuable, in turn the estates administered their debt
 in a way to further that reputation and enhance their local political power.
 Further, each of the estates' bond issues was backed by specific anticipated
 26 Because we know what debts were outstanding in 1790, the only debts for which we lack informa-
 tion are those for which the registers do not mention repayment dates and which were not outstanding
 in 1790. We assumed that their repayment schedules were the same as those of debts of the same
 vintage, which had a distribution of durations.
 27 On reputation and the relation between the estates and the crown, see Potter, "Good Offices"; and
 Potter and Rosenthal, "Politics," pp. 606-11.
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 tax revenues, and the bonds continued to be marketed by notaries rather than
 bankers. Hence, we cannot speak of a transition toward a more anonymous
 and spontaneously developing market. Nonetheless, as the next sections
 show, there was considerable institutional change at the margin. First, after
 1725, the estates and the crown transformed an unpredictable negotiation
 process into a more systematic process of public finance. Second, the estates
 expanded their solicitation of investors to Paris. Finally, the estates adapted
 their debt management to the Parisian legal environment so as to facilitate
 the development of a secondary market.
 THE RISE OF INTERMEDIATION
 To survive as a meaningful political entity the estates had to borrow. This
 was particularly true in the last two decades of Louis XIV's reign when the
 amount of debt outstanding increased very rapidly. To fund these mountains
 of bonds the estates could rely only on a narrow range of fiscal revenues, as
 the crown appropriated the rest. Hence, they were forced to mortgage reve-
 nues from ever more distant years, and not surprisingly these bonds matured
 slowly compared to those they had issued before 1700. After 1725, borrow-
 ing continued to expand as the amount of total taxation in Burgundy that
 was mortgaged increased, but the distance in time between borrowing and
 repayment remained stable. In fact the standard agreement between the
 crown and the estates stipulated that the province could keep enough reve-
 nue to pay off the bonds in the decade following their issue, and the estates
 kept to the schedule. The driving force behind the expansion of Burgundian
 debt was clearly the crown, but the estates also faced practical problems: as
 their borrowing rose they had to reach more and more lenders. Failing to do
 so would surely mean the end of the province's privileges. Given the limited
 amount of wealth available to be tapped in Burgundy, the estates had to
 broaden their geographical and social reach. Given the cost of travel in
 particular, broadening the geographical span of lenders presented a serious
 challenge.
 The estates were able to meet this challenge by relying upon the services
 of different intermediaries. Until the 1720s these were local informal inter-
 mediaries, often wives or relatives of financial officials, who were well
 placed within the community of local notables to narrow the informational
 divide between estates and lenders. The steady migration of members of
 important families from Dijon to Paris provided another channel to secure
 additional funds.
 As the challenge of raising ever more money grew, the estates had to look
 directly to Paris for more of their funds, and notaries became dominant in
 the mediation of the estates' debt both in Paris and in Dijon. Indeed, by the
 1740s the estates had to secure loans from individuals who had little or no
 1034
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 direct knowledge of the province's political or financial dealings. Notaries
 were also instrumental in facilitating trades on the secondary market, which,
 as we will demonstrate, became a particularly important issue for the estates
 in the latter half of the eighteenth century.28
 We leave aside the informal intermediaries of the late seventeenth and
 early eighteenth century. They offered only a limited range of services. They
 placed funds with and received payments from the estates for individuals
 they knew personally. Although these informal intermediaries testify to the
 spontaneous emergence of market makers, their contribution was limited.
 The local informal intermediaries had mixed success in expanding the es-
 tates' reach to Paris, and they could not create a secondary market. The
 estates' own financial hierarchy also played a small role in finding lenders.
 It was not until notaries displaced the informal intermediaries that a second-
 ary market formed and that uninformed lenders began to be attracted to the
 estates' loans.
 Notaries were therefore the most important intermediaries. As we argued
 earlier, the estates' interactions with notaries depended on two dimensions:
 first, the extent to which (or the cost by which) the estates could reach lenders
 directly; and second, the thickness of the market (the proportion of all transac-
 tions in the market that related to estates debts). One can see intuitively that,
 as any bond market as a whole grows, overcoming asymmetric information
 requires more effort. Hence intermediation should be more intense in larger
 markets. To the extent that each intermediary has exclusive information about
 a subset of lenders, as borrowing increases more intermediaries will be in-
 volved. Conversely, the thinner the market for estates bonds, the more con-
 centrated the intermediation in those bonds is likely to have been.
 The existence of two interlinked markets for Burgundian debt provides
 an ideal arena to study the circulation of information in Old Regime debt
 markets. The estates themselves identified notaries as the key intermediaries
 in the placement of their debt, yet they did not elaborate as to what specific
 role notaries played. Given that the estates had their debt contracts drawn up
 by notaries, two possibilities arise. First, notaries provided scrivening ser-
 vices but little mediation. Second, notaries provided both scrivening and
 informational services. Given that the information requirements of the pri-
 mary and secondary markets were different, finding that notaries were
 merely scribes in the primary market does not imply that they played no
 informational role in the secondary market. To examine their roles, then, we
 compare their functions in both the primary and secondary markets for
 Burgundian debt in both Dijon and Paris. We therefore restrict our attention
 to the years beginning in 1740 when the estates began to market debt in
 Paris, though the patterns that will be described for Dijon also hold earlier.
 28 For a broad outline of these early changes in intermediaries, see Potter and Rosenthal, "Burgun-
 dian Estates' Bond Market," pp. 184-89.
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 FIGURE 1
 INTERMEDIARIES AND THE VOLUME OF ESTATE BONDS TRANSACTED IN DUON,
 1740-1790
 Sources: AD CO, registers, C 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4631,
 4632, 4634, 4635, 4638, 4639, 4640, 4641, 4649, 4654, 4659.
 In Dijon a single notary drew up all of the estates' contracts, despite the
 fact that there were 14 notaries active in Dijon at any one time.29 The sec-
 ondary market, on the other hand, was far less concentrated in Dijon. The
 most active notary drew up 65 percent of resale contracts, and the activity
 was spread out among four notaries on average each year. As Figure 1
 shows, there was no relation between the amount of activity and the number
 of notaries involved in initial issues. The relationship between the number
 of intermediaries and the volume of activity on the secondary market was
 weak though slightly positive.
 In Paris, the reverse patterns held (Figure 2). On average, some 18 nota-
 ries drew up initial contracts in any given year. Over the 50 years follow-
 ing 1740, 1 10 of 1 13 notaries participated in the drawing up of initial con-
 tracts. Further, the share of the most active etude (notarial practice) over
 these 50 years was only 31 percent of all the activity. The secondary market,
 29 More precisely, no more than two notaries drew up contracts in any given year. Two notaries were
 involved in years when the estates changed notaries.
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 FIGURE 2
 INTERMEDIARIES AND THE VALUE OF ESTATE BONDS TRANSACTED IN PARIS,
 1740-1790
 Sources: AD CO, registers, C 4597, 4598, 4607, 4615, 4616, 4618, 4625, 4626, 4627, 4628, 4631,
 4632,4634,4635,4638,4639,4640,4641,4649,4654,4659.
 by contrast, was far more concentrated, with half as many notaries partici-
 pating in an average year and only 35 etudes participating in secondary
 transactions after 1740. The most active etude accounted for 53 percent
 of the value of all secondary transactions. Finally, in Paris, the relation-
 ship between annual levels of activity and the number of participating
 notaries is quite marked: increased activity required the agency of more
 notaries.
 These different patterns suggest that information flowed in strikingly
 different ways in Dijon and Paris. The data for Dijon are consistent with
 the argument that lenders required few informational services (from nota-
 ries at least) and that when the estates decided to borrow they were able
 to mobilize the local sources of capital directly. Notaries were not needed
 in Dijon as brokers of information. The estates were the dominant borrow-
 ers on the Dijon market. In the 1740s the estates' share of the perpetual-
 annuity market was about half (see Table 3). By 1780 they borrowed 63
 percent of the perpetual-annuity funds in Dijon, and that amounted to half
 of all notarial credit. Their dominant financial position and their public
 political role made it feasible for them to attract lenders directly. Both
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 TABLE 3
 VOLUME OF NOTARIAL LENDING IN DIJON
 (volume of new loans in 1,000s of livres)
 Private Obligations Private Rentes Estates Bonds Total
 1740 81 740 631 1,452
 1760 106 165 991 1,262
 1780 300 473 694 1,467
 Sources: For private lending, AD Cote D'Or C 8670-72, 8724-28, and 8780-83. For the estates we
 give the nine-year average centered on the date for which we sample private credit. Obligations were
 standard IOUs with a maturity of one to three years, and Rentes were annuities on which repayment
 was the borrowers' option, they were outstanding on average about 15 years.
 because they had to borrow so much and because they had the administra-
 tive means to advertise in Dijon, they had little need for intermediaries. So
 the estates made use of notaries' services simply to draw up contracts. Be-
 cause drawing up contracts could easily be done by any notary, they only
 used one.
 In the case of the secondary market, notaries appear to have played a
 more important role. It seems likely that information about resale opportuni-
 ties was more difficult to diffuse because in each year, each bond issue
 actually represented a different investment, and small numbers of bonds
 from each issue came on the market. Notaries therefore had a role to play in
 matching the buyers and sellers of Burgundian debt contracts, even in Dijon.
 Because the estates' bonds were so important in the market, most notaries
 were somewhat involved in this activity. Therefore for Dijon, at least, infor-
 mation and market thickness both seem to play an important role in explain-
 ing the structure of intermediation.
 In Paris, the estates could not assume that everyone was well informed
 about their borrowing requirements or their political and financial situation.
 The estates employed two strategies to reach lenders. Early on, the estates
 tried to reach Parisians primarily through traditional networks centered on
 persons with clear Burgundian connections.30 Most of these lenders sub-
 scribed to debt issues via their networks directly in Dijon, and their contracts
 were drawn up in the offices of Dijon notaries. Though the sums raised in
 Paris in the 1710s were substantial, the clienteles of Parisians willing to
 contract with the estates through Dijonnais intermediaries were rather nar-
 row. Accordingly, in the 1740s the estates decided to float bonds directly in
 Paris. The data suggest that to reach more Parisian lenders, the estates de-
 pended on notaries. Indeed in Paris the link between the sums issued annu-
 ally and the numbers of notaries involved is quite clear. When the estates
 30 Members of the Conde clientele, for example, who would have had few other means of informing
 themselves of Burgundian bonds other than by through their political and clientele contacts, show up
 in our data as heavy investors in the first decades of the eighteenth century. See Potter and Rosenthal,
 "Burgundian Estates' Bond Market."
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 needed to reach more lenders they required the assistance of a greater num-
 ber of Parisian notaries.31
 The estates were aware of their dependence on notaries to reach lenders
 in Paris. Indeed, in 1742 the estates attempted to cut notaries' commissions
 in Paris and in Dijon, though without success, as their deliberations indicate:
 Mr. Chartraire de Montigny, treasurer of the estates of the province, [informs us]
 that the considerable amounts that he must borrow for the province, as instructed by
 the deliberations of the elus [members of the estates's executive], are being raised
 only very slowly. Indeed, both Parisian and Burgundian notaries who normally
 handle the brokerage between depositors and lenders are slowing down and refusing
 to fulfill the duties of their offices and even turning away those who want to lend
 their money. It is typical in Paris and elsewhere to pay them a fee for these sorts of
 loans, and as a consequence they are preventing everyone with money to invest from
 placing it in the province's coffers ... .32
 The estates quickly agreed to restore the commissions to their old levels.
 One does not know what had prompted the attempt to reduce their fees. The
 timing of the attempt, coinciding with the beginning of significant sales in
 Paris, is nonetheless suggestive. Officials of the estates may well have
 thought that they could issue bonds in Paris in much the same way as they
 did in Dijon-without recourse to the intermediaries as vehicles of informa-
 tion between them and potential lenders. Given their good reputation they
 may well have thought that they could force notaries to reduce their fees
 because they did not require them as intermediaries. Yet as both their delib-
 erations and the connection between notaries and issue volume suggest, the
 estates were wrong.
 For Paris, at least, their failure is easily explained. In the capital there
 were a large number of public institutions seeking to borrow, and the estates
 were not the most visible borrower.33 In fact, in the capital the estates' bor-
 rowing contributed little to overall credit. After 1742 they amounted to
 about 1 percent of notarized loans in Paris. Further, unlike in Dijon, the
 estates had no direct vehicle to apprise Parisians of their need for funds.
 Finally, Parisians typically relied on notaries to find out about investment
 opportunities, be they private or public bonds, because notaries were well
 informed about financial affairs. Given the limited importance of Burgun-
 dian borrowing to Parisian credit overall, the estates could not hope to create
 a different mediation structure than that which developed.
 31 One cannot appeal to a cartel among notaries to explain this pattern. Indeed activity was unevenly
 distributed across notaries, and each notary's share was unstable. For other evidence that brokerage
 services were competitive, see Hoffman et al., Priceless Markets.
 32 ADCO, C 4565, 15 September 1742.
 33 One would surely place the crown (through the H6tel de Ville de Paris), and the Assembly of the
 Clergy before the Estates of Burgundy. The Estates of Languedoc and Brittany would also have held
 an equal if not greater position as seekers of Parisian credit.
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 In effect, when the estates borrowed in Paris they were just like any other
 borrower and they depended on notaries to bridge the informational distance
 between them and their lenders. Because each saver typically selected one
 notary to rely upon, their solicitation of funds required the participation of
 many notaries.34 It is no surprise then that when the estates issued bonds in
 Paris, they were drawn up by as many as 20 different notaries or one-fifth
 of the entire corporation notarial. Furthermore, as the amount of debt issue
 rose, the number of notaries increased.
 The widespread dispersion of the estates' borrowing activity among Pari-
 sian notaries should not obscure the critical role played by notaries in etude
 XCII. The process whereby the notaries of etude XCII secured this leader-
 ship was historically determined but rather straightforward. The notaries
 (Roger, Mareschal, and Bro) who succeeded each other in that position were
 also the successive notaries of the Conde princes who, under the Old Re-
 gime, were governors of Burgundy. As we detailed in a previous work,
 members of the Conde clientele in Paris had been early investors in the es-
 tates' bonds, and they tended to have their notarized contracts drawn up with
 their patron's notary.35 Officials of the estates, furthermore, also relied upon
 the services of these notaries for provincial business. Therefore even before
 the expansion of Burgundian borrowing in Paris was underway, the notaries
 in etude XCIIhad a significant advantage over other competitors. They were
 better informed about the province's affairs, and they had already captured
 a large population of lenders predisposed to lend to the Estates of Burgundy.
 The successive notaries who occupied etude XCII seem to have played a
 role similar to that of lead underwriters in current stock issues, releasing
 information from the issuer (in our case the estates) to the rest of the broker-
 age community (other Parisian notaries). Unlike the investment banking
 firms that underwrite financial issues today, Parisian notaries did not guaran-
 tee issue prices to the borrowers. Rather, they behaved like contemporary
 mortgage brokers and charged a finder's fee equal to a fraction of the value
 of the loan. As the lead brokers, the notaries of etude XCII concentrated
 nearly a third of all bond issues for the estates in Paris between 1740 and
 1790. Indeed the pattern of referrals identified by Hoffman et al. suggests
 that other notaries acquired information about the estates by periodically
 referring their clients to etude XCII.36
 Secondary trades relied even more heavily on intermediaries than did the
 process of issuing bonds. Although the bonds marketed by the estates in a
 given year had similar characteristics, those bonds that were put on the
 secondary market differed according to the date that they had been issued.
 Further, there were relatively few of them. In other words, the secondary
 34 Hoffman et al., Priceless Markets, Ch. 8.
 35 Potter and Rosenthal, "Burgundian Estates' Bond Market."
 36 Hoffman et al., Priceless Markets.
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 market for the estates' bonds was thin. Matching buyer and seller in second-
 ary contracts was therefore a more complicated affair than was the initial
 issuing of debts. Moreover, the supply of bonds for resale varied greatly
 over time, so that some mechanism to reduce information costs was highly
 desirable. Notaries in Paris at least seem to have arrived at a practice that is
 not too dissimilar from the way closely held stocks were traded in the nine-
 teenth century.37 One notary (from etude XCII) handled the bulk of second-
 ary sales, acting as the broker for such contracts in nearly 55 percent of the
 cases. Given the reciprocal structure of notarized brokerage, the share of
 activity centralized by etude XCII was no doubt larger.38 We imagine that
 clients who wanted to sell or buy a Burgundian bond alerted their notary
 who in turn contacted the notary in etude XCII. Once a match between a
 seller and a buyer had been effected, the contract could be drawn up by
 either the buyer's notary, that of the seller, or by the notary of etude XCII.
 The relative concentration of activity in etude XCII therefore reflects both
 the limited availability of information and the relative thinness of the mar-
 ket. Thus, as we move from primary markets to secondary markets, whether
 in Dijon or Paris, the value of information becomes more important. And as
 we move from Dijon to Paris, the importance of Burgundian bonds in the
 market declines. The intermediary structures reflect these differences.
 PROVIDING LIQUIDITY
 Beyond concerns for the returns on their investments, the bondholders of
 the Estates of Burgundy also cared about liquidity. Had the estates only
 borrowed short term, the issue of liquidity would have been moot because
 whenever the loans came due, investors would have had the opportunity to
 reevaluate their portfolios. The estates, however, focused on long-term debt,
 and up to the 1740s at least the duration of these debts was increasing (from
 about six years prior to 1700 to 11 years). As a result, in the absence of any
 mechanism for reselling these debts, individuals were locked into long-term
 investments. Such constraints do not seem to have mattered to some inves-
 tors-in particular to institutions that held their bonds for very long periods
 of time. Yet it seems to have been a concern for most potential individual
 lenders to the estates.
 The secondary market allowed lenders to secure liquidity, and we can
 measure its extent in two ways. First, the Estates of Burgundy maintained
 meticulous records about their bondholders. Officials kept track of changes
 in ownership in their registers. In most cases, the information recorded was
 sufficient that we can ascertain whether contracts changed hands either
 37 For the listing of issues "en banque," see Davis and Cull, International Capital Markets.
 38 Given the referral activity uncovered by Hoffman et al., it is likely that Bro, the notary of etude
 XCII from 1766 to 1805 played an important role in transmitting information about the estates to other
 notaries.
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 through bequests or as the result of trading. Further, in their deliberations,
 the estates demonstrated a concern to facilitate the creation of a secondary
 market for their bonds. We can therefore match changes in policy with
 changes in the extent of the secondary market.
 To ascertain the frequency of secondary trades in Burgundian debt we
 begin with a very simple calculation. Over the 120 years that our data span,
 we can ask: What was the likelihood that a bond was ever resold? The evi-
 dence is quite accurate after 1720, and somewhat less before. Officials of the
 estates spent less effort distinguishing between bequests and market trans-
 fers in the early period. Because both bequests and trades are counted to-
 gether in our data in the earlier period, our evidence of a rise in secondary
 trades is in fact understated. For each year between 1660 and 1739, on
 average less than one outstanding contract in 200 was part of an exchange
 process. (See Table 4). But in the three decades that followed 1740, about
 2 percent or more of the outstanding bonds were traded each year. From
 1780 to 1789 the rate falls somewhat. Obviously, contracts signed after 1780
 were unlikely to be traded before the Revolution.
 More importantly the summary registers which we use do not contain all
 the secondary trades. For the period 1740-1779, when we add the turnover
 associated with the steady reimbursement policies of the estates to the re-
 sales, some 13 percent of all contracts were traded. To be sure the estates'
 bonds did not approach the liquidity offered by British consols at the same
 time-this is no surprise, as no other security in the world was even re-
 motely as liquid. Burgundian bonds differed in two ways from British con-
 sols. Their total value was relatively trivial and they did not benefit from an
 organized exchange. Given the relationship between size of issue and liquid-
 ity observed in modem markets, it is likely that size explains more of the
 differences in liquidity than the secondary-market institutions. Hence it is
 perhaps not surprising that the turnover of the estates' bonds was not much
 different from what has been found for the early corporations on the London
 Stock Exchange.39 By historical standards at least, the estates and the nota-
 ries were able to offer investors in estates bonds a non-negligible amount of
 liquidity.
 The rise in secondary transactions after 1740 was largely the product of
 institutional changes promoted by the estates. As we have noted elsewhere,
 in that decade the estates began to market a large fraction of their debt
 through Parisian notaries.40 As a result they had to contend not only with a
 different clientele of lenders, but with a very different legal environment. In
 Burgundy, long-term bonds were deemed moveable; they could not be
 pledged as collateral for debt, and therefore all private transfers, however
 informal, were legally binding (provided, of course, that the seller actually
 39 Carlos, Key, and Dupree, "Learning."
 40 Potter and Rosenthal, "Burgundian Estates' Bond Market," pp. 173-95.
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 TABLE 4
 FREQUENCY OF SECONDARY TRADES BY ISSUE DATE
 Bonds Secondary Bonds Trades / Issues Trades per Year/ Outstanding
 Issued Trades Outstanding (percentage) (percentage)
 1660-1679 382 13 133 3 0.49
 1680-1699 1,673 48 534 3 0.45
 1700-1719 4,555 97 1,966 2 0.25
 1720-1739 1,331 110 768 8 0.72
 1740-1759 3,548 557 1,343 16 2.07
 1760-1779 5,497 1,037 1,929 19 2.69
 1780-1790 3,577 671 3,823 19 1.76
 Note: Bonds issued and secondary trades are the total number of bonds issued and the total number
 traded that are in our data set for the relevant 20 years. Bonds Outstanding is the period average.
 Because our sources change, turnover in the 1780s is likely to be undercounted.
 owned the bond). The narrower clientele of bondholders in Burgundy also
 did not require any significant innovations in the institutional structure in
 order to trade bonds. The heavy presence of the relatively close-knit Dijon-
 nais elite among Burgundian bondholders allowed for an informal exchange
 process to satisfy the rare cases in which someone needed to recover his
 capital in advance of reimbursement. Further, the Burgundian elite were
 regular investors in the bonds. Short of massive unanticipated demands for
 capital, each family could manage its portfolio of bonds simply by choosing
 the level of their net investments each year.41
 Paris was another universe entirely. In the vast financial marketplace of
 Paris, there were few social or professional mechanisms for individuals to
 market specific types of debt. Further, given that each individual had a vast
 number of potential correspondents, it was unlikely that typical lenders
 would be well informed about anyone but their closest associates. Such lack
 of good information combined with the poor legal standing of secondary
 transfers made exchange processes difficult. Yet the demand for secondary
 transfers was higher in Paris than in Burgundy because few Parisian held
 such broad portfolios of specifically Burgundian bonds as did members of
 the Dijonnais elite. Finally, the expected life span of Burgundian bonds had
 increased from about six years in the seventeenth century to almost 14 years
 in the middle part of the eighteenth century. This in itself increased the
 demand for a mechanism to ease the development of a secondary market in
 Burgundian bonds.
 A secondary market for Burgundian bonds arose spontaneously in Dijon
 because there were few legal obstacles to such trades and because these
 bonds dominated the market, hence each Dijon notary usually had potential
 buyers among his own clients. The estates appear to have thought that much
 the same would occur in Paris but that was not the case for legal reasons. In
 4' Such regular investors made nearly annual investments and were therefore the recipients of nearly
 annual reimbursements.
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 the capital, long-term loans were considered real estate, and as the custom
 of Paris prescribed, they could be pledged as collateral for other debts, for
 widows' portions, or for children's inheritances. Even more problematic,
 heirs of the original subscriber could request a return of the asset from a
 secondary buyer so long as they paid the transaction price. If the value of the
 asset rose, the heirs would be tempted to request a return. Clearly the legal
 nature of long-term loans in Paris made their resale less easy.42 This problem
 plagued all annuity loans. Jurists and the crown had long ago solved the
 problem by inventing a legal fiction: reconstitutions. In these contracts the
 private parties to a secondary transfer shored up their transactions by trans-
 forming it into two formally separate transactions, a reimbursement and a
 new loan. Doing so required the participation of the issuer of the bond who
 borrowed from the new holder and reimbursed the original holder of the
 bond. The appearance of the original issuer in these resale contracts makes
 it appear as though he was offering buy-back services in lieu of a real sec-
 ondary market-but this is no more than appearance. Indeed, both in the
 case of royal loans (where the practice was initiated) and in the case of
 Burgundian loans, the issuers made no effort to find new bondholders. The
 mechanism created a legal chasm between the creditors of the original bond-
 holder and the new buyer.
 The estates were not attuned to Parisian legal constraints and thus did not
 anticipate the problems created by the custom of Paris. Thus they initially
 did not authorize their agents to participate in reconstitution contracts in
 Paris. Yet faced with difficulty in marketing their bonds, they were quick to
 respond. In 1743 they announced that they would participate in drawing up
 reconstituted contracts.43 Their decision had a dramatic impact because the
 rate of secondary trades quintupled in a decade. As Table 5 shows, contracts
 issued from the early 1730s through 1743 were infrequently resold. How-
 ever, after the reform of 1743 they were more likely to be resold-indeed
 they were about as likely to be traded as were contracts issued in the 1770s.
 More precisely, for contracts issued in the 1730s trades that occurred in the
 first ten years from the date of issue (that is, mostly prior to 1743) account
 for a little more than a third of all trades. For contracts issued in the 1740s,
 trades that occurred in the decade following the initial issue accounted for
 nearly twice that proportion. Thus the reform of the secondary market was
 reflected in a large increase in the propensity to transfer contracts in the first
 ten years following their issue.
 Yet the rise of the secondary market was not the only mechanism that the
 estates used to promote liquidity. Indeed the secondary market did have
 42 Secondary holders worried that they would buy a Burgundian rente from someone who had used
 it as collateral for some private debt that would then be defaulted upon. The creditor of the private debt
 contract could then sue the secondary holder of the Burgundian bondholder to recover the value of his
 loan.
 43 ADCO, C 4565, 12 March 1743.
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 TABLE 5
 TRADES OF PARTICULAR VINTAGES
 Issue Date
 Trades in Years 1730-1734 1735-1739 1740-1744 1745-1749
 1730-1734 3
 1735-1739 6 11
 1740-1744 7 3 20
 1745-1749 10 18 35 73
 1750-1754 1 4 9 70
 Total trades 28 36 66 143
 Number of bonds issued 339 285 739 1,383
 Share of trades in the 33 38 65 58
 first ten years to trades
 in the first 25 years
 (percentage)
 Note: The data enumerate the number of secondary transfers for each five years for each vintage of
 debt.
 Sources: The data were drawn from AD CO, registers,4583,4584,4585,4586,4587,4588,4597,4598,
 4607, and 4615.
 significant costs. Individual Parisians, for example, had to bear the costs of
 simply drawing up reconstitutions. In response, the estates decided in 1773
 to provide further assistance to individuals who wanted to get rid of the
 bonds.44 Officials of the estates argued that their unparalleled credit rating
 afforded them a unique advantage. Any creditor who had any difficulty get-
 ting rid of a Burgundian bond could simply contact the officers of the estates
 and they would be put in a reimbursement queue. Instead of simply randomly
 selecting bondholders for reimbursement each year, the estates would now
 first reimburse those individuals on the list and then turn to others to com-
 plete their reimbursement schedule. As long as the demand for early repay-
 ment was small (most investors were long-term investors) the estates could
 do so at little cost. This willingness to reimburse individuals on demand
 explains in part the decline in trades seen in the 1770s and 1780s.
 The estates' declarations show that they perceived the demand for liquid-
 ity and that they could not provide it on their own. But there is also a direct
 measure of the value of secondary transactions to the estates. We can con-
 trast the mean duration of contracts that were never traded until reimburse-
 ment and that of contracts that were part of one or more exchange pro-
 cesses.45 Contracts that were not resold were reimbursed significantly sooner
 than contracts that had been resold. This result is both statistically and sub-
 stantively important. At peak, a traded contract was outstanding almost
 twice as long as a contract of the same vintage that was not resold (17 years
 44 ADCO, C 4569, 18 February 1773, D1liberations des Elus.
 45 We ignore here the difference between contracts that were only traded once and those that were
 traded multiple times. It appears, though, that contracts traded more than once were reimbursed, more
 often than not, after those that were traded only once. Each trade lengthened the life of the bond.
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 versus 8.5 years). After 1740 when trades became common, they extended
 average duration by five years or nearly 50 percent. It is clear, then, why the
 estates opted to assist in the establishment of a secondary market. Such
 extended contracts gave them added flexibility in the management of their
 financial affairs.
 The estates did help ease the process of providing opportunities for their
 bondholders to sell their bonds, but one should not overstate the importance
 of these innovations. In fact it is likely that their innovations were prompted
 by broader developments in credit markets. First, despite its catastrophic
 conclusion, France's experiment with paper money in the 1710s (the Law
 affair) had educated Parisians as to the value of a secondary market in finan-
 cial instruments.46 Second, in the 1740s the crown decided to sell some of
 its debts as term bearer bonds. Though these debts were similar to those of
 the estates, the crown gave them the legal status of movable assets, thus
 easing their resale. From the estates' point of view, this likely reduced the
 relative attractiveness of their bonds, possibly threatening their political
 position. Thus the estates responded by offering a mechanism to ease the
 legal uncertainties behind debt transfers in Paris. Third, the two decades
 after the end of the Law affair saw the rise of notaries as important financial
 intermediaries in Paris. They specialized in placing long-term loans, and
 they were the ones who actually ran the secondary market for estates debts.
 Had the estates been the only borrower wishing to assist its lenders with
 trades, it is unlikely that Parisian notaries would have found it worthwhile
 to acquire the informational base needed to broker such transactions.47 Thus
 the estates alone could not have caused the institutional changes necessary
 to ease the trade in their bonds in Paris. The institutional innovations that
 characterized the Paris market in the 1740s thus diffused to Dijon and to the
 estates' debt administration. This reinforces our suspicion that long-term
 bond markets were less geographically isolated from each other than has
 heretofore been suggested.
 CONCLUSION
 The estates' own financial innovations reflected the informal arrange-
 ments of the capital's notaries. In Dijon, however, innovation by notaries
 was stifled by the very size and publicity of the estates' borrowing. In both
 markets formal and informal institutions co-evolved but the relationships
 between borrowers and lenders were different in each market. In fact, even
 though credit remained personal, there were at least two more degrees of
 separation between the estates and their creditors in Paris than in Dijon.
 Reaching these more distant lenders mattered greatly to the estates because
 46 Hoffman et al., Priceless Markets, Ch. 6.
 47 Hoffman et al., Priceless Markets, Ch. 8.
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 it allowed them to borrow three times as much as when they had restricted
 their solicitations to Burgundians.
 Studying other large borrowers would yield further information about the
 process of financial integration in Old Regime France. Other provincial es-
 tates, the Assembly of the Clergy, and the great aristocratic households were
 all heavily involved in credit, and each could choose among several different
 markets. The timing of their decision to borrow in Paris would tell us much
 about the link between financial innovation and financial concentration.
 By shining a bright light on the intermediation of debt, the records of the
 Estates of Burgundy point to the importance of scale effects in financial
 intermediation. Though much has been written about the importance of large
 cities in European development in general, and of London in particular, less
 attention has been paid to the discontinuities inherent in financial networks.
 Though Dijon was one of the 25 largest town in France in the eighteenth
 century, the organization of its financial markets was closer to that of a
 small market town than it was to that of Paris.48
 For Dijon one could argue that the very concentration of demand for
 funds in a reputable borrower reduced the need for intermediation. Clearly
 had Dijon experienced the same total demand but from a much more dis-
 persed set of borrowers the need for intermediation would have been much
 greater. Yet such a counterfactual argument neglects the fact that in the
 absence of the estates, total borrowing would undoubtedly have been less in
 Dijon. Further, the size of the estates' debts permitted the rise of secondary
 market, something that did not occur in markets with purely private debts
 and which did increase the work of intermediaries.
 In Paris by the 1750s, the privately possessed information of notaries was
 critical to the credit market. Nobody could borrow extensively without the
 assistance of notaries. In contrast, in Dijon as in many other small markets
 there were well-known borrowers who had little need for financial services.
 It is our good fortune that the estates straddled these two markets to reveal
 their different modes of functioning.
 During what is frequently thought to be a period of institutional stagna-
 tion in France, the estates achieved a remarkable broadening of their clien-
 tele of investors and a consequent massive increase in indebtedness. Thus
 absolutism in itself did not prevent the development of large capital mar-
 kets, although it may have constrained them in way further research may
 uncover. Nor can Roman or customary law be blamed for the differential
 development of credit in France and Britain. French legal institutions
 proved flexible enough to accommodate significant financial innovations
 after the 1720s.
 48 Lepetit, Les villes, p. 450.
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